Thursday, November 24, 2016

Modeling the Libra Oil Field


November 24, 2016,
Dear readers,
Below you may read my paper "Modeling the Libra Oil Field." This paper is a follow-up to my collaboration with OpenOil in developing Brazil's Libra oil field financial model. OpenOil is a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources.          
Thank you
Kind regards,

Saturday, November 12, 2016

OPENOIL — Interview With Alessandro Bacci

November 12, 2016,
Dear readers,
Below you may watch my interview with OpenOil, a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources. The video was filmed at the end of October in Berlin, Germany, where I participated in OpenOil's Open Financial Modeling Sprint, a workshop (Oct. 24-28) centered on financial modeling in the extractive industries. In specific, my participation was related to the development of Brazil's Libra oil field financial model, which OpenOil and I have recently produced.               
Thank you
Kind regards,

Thursday, November 10, 2016

Libra Project, Brazil — Fiscal Model


November 10, 2016,
Dear readers,
Below you may download the Excel file related to Brazil's Libra oil field financial model, which OpenOil and I have recently developed. OpenOil is a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources. In specific, I have had the honor to work at this project with Alistair Watson, who is OpenOil's leading expert and one of the world's best consultants with reference to extractive industry fiscal regime design and analysis.               
Thank you
Kind regards,


Wednesday, November 9, 2016

Libra Project, Brazil — Presentation


November 9, 2016,
Dear readers,
Below you may read the presentation related to Brazil's Libra oil field financial model, which OpenOil and I have recently developed. OpenOil is a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources. In specific, I have had the honor to work at this project with Alistair Watson, who is OpenOil's leading expert and one of the world's best consultants with reference to extractive industry fiscal regime design and analysis.               
Thank you
Kind regards,

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Libra Project, Brazil — Narrative Report


November 7, 2016,
Dear readers,
Below you may read the narrative report related to Brazil's Libra oil field financial model, which OpenOil and I have recently developed. OpenOil is a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources.             
Thank you
Kind regards,

Monday, November 7, 2016

OPENOIL – Brazil’s $90 Billion Libra Field in Trouble – Says Public Data


November 7, 2016,
Dear readers,
I would like to share with you the following post by OpenOil, a consultancy, publishing house and training provider, specialized on open data products and services around natural resources. OpenOil and I have recently developed a financial model regarding Brazil's Libra oil field. The post below will provide you with more details about the Libra model. From my side, participating in this study has been a very interesting experience and has helped me to improve my skills with reference to financial modeling.            
Thank you
Kind regards,

Brazil’s $90 Billion Libra Field in Trouble – Says Public Data

Posted by Johnny West on Friday, November 4, 2016 

We are delighted to publish the first in our series of open financial models to be produced with teams from government, civil society and the private sector from all over the world – using only publicly available information

Brazil’s Libra field has been the subject of intense public interest since the deal for it was announced in 2013. It is the flagship for the country’s attempt to become a major global exporter. The massive field lies 250 km offshore in the pre-salt – under 2,000 m of water and another 5,000 m of rock, requiring mind boggling technology to locate, and produce out.

It was also the first, and still only, Production Sharing Contract (PSC) contract in Brazil, signed to encourage the majors to sink the enormous amounts of investment in needed – some $90 billion in the Libra field alone.

The project was conceived, signed and planned out before the price crash began in mid-2014. Since then, as Brent dropped from $100 per barrel to below $50 today. The consortium, which groups Petrobras, Shell, Total, CNPC and CNOOC, is still working on its program roll out.

This model shows Libra is unlikely to go forward in the form publicly discussed so far. It could be that a more incremental development plan is deployed – fewer wells producing less oil. It could be that the final investment decision is effectively suspended until oil moves above current prices. Even if the field could produce 10 billion barrels (the middle scenario), investors would need an oil price to average $54 per barrel, throughout the lifetime of the project, in real 2016 terms, to break even. And there is obviously all manner of technical, market and even political risk. It could be that the project never goes ahead at all.

Information is sketchy. But the assumptions – around costs, prices, scheduling, and the impact of Brazil’s fiscal regime, have been checked against publicly available sources. We invite both the government and the consortium to contribute any further data they would like, to further refine the model (as Rio Tinto and Shell have in OpenOil’s previous model releases).

The model is freely available on the Internet, as open data, for download and experimentation, and the user can change parameters and instantly see the change in results.

The Libra project page details the document set that go with the Excel spreadsheet, the processes used, the provenance of every piece of data and assumption.

It is the first of 10 such models OpenOil will be publishing in the next few weeks. All open and downloadable.

We welcome scrutiny – and criticism – because we see open financial modeling as the necessary next stage of transparency in the oil and mining industries. Each of the coming models address a clutch of analytical questions, because each project has its specificities. How much did that tax holiday cost the government, and what does investor profitability look like without it? Is there a tax gap between what the model predicts and what processes like EITI show have turned up? What do investor returns look like in the new low price environment? How much is that large government equity stake really worth once you take project finance into account? Will the project ever even go ahead (as in Libra), or, as in other cases, re-open? Is there any significant difference between prices the company reports it obtained (”actuals”) and global benchmarks?

We believe modelling – at project level, grasping all the quirks and artefacts of the real world – is the new normal of transparency.

We’ve been working on open financial models in-house now for 30 months. But this new phase, completed in a 5 day “sprint” last week here in Germany, takes it out to the world. Each of the coming batch has been co-developed with a partner. In a couple of cases, such as this one, by an individual consultant (watch Alessandro Bacci’s explanation of why he did this, soon to be published), but mostly teams. Governments, civil society organisations, think tanks.

What is needed to make this happen is not just capacity building, but standard techniques. In this regard, I would like to thank F1F9 both for their leadership in the evolution of the FAST modeling standard, which is entirely open, but also their considerable pro bono support to this kick off project. It is these techniques which allow peer review and robustness, to escape from “cottage industry” models and black box results.

This is what has started to happen. Each model was extensively reviewed by the group of modelers at the sprint – the work of an eastern African finance ministry reviewed by an Indonesian NGO, that of a Calgary-based industry consultant by West African mining officials.

We look forward to your comments on each model, and invite anyone interested in taking this forward with us – as modelers, users, champions – to contact us.

Sunday, July 3, 2016

The Islamic State’s Oil Industry Is a Pipe Dream


The analysis “The Islamic State Oil Industry Is a Pipe Dream” has been initially published by Oilpro, a professional network for the oil and gas professionals.

July 3, 2016

CALGARY, Canada — While I am writing this analysis, we have still to metabolize the great sadness related to the two terrorist attacks that have occurred in the last few days. The first one at the Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul, Turkey, where more than 40 people were killed. The second one at an upscale restaurant in the diplomatic quarter of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where 20 people were killed. It’s indeed another very gloomy page of the endless terrorist attacks against civilians. These horrible attacks against innocent people are very difficult to intercept and to stop. Reality and rationality tell us that we have to live with the possible remote (per single person) occurrence of such events. Logic and probability would dictate to us that we should rationally worry more the possibility of dying of several diseases than about the possibility of being killed by a terrorist attack — but it’s not easy to be calm and rational when terrorist events occur. For sure, introducing a police state will not be a solution; introducing a lot of restrictions would enormously limit our way of living. And, living under a police state would be a victory for the terrorists of every kind.

The basis for this analysis is primarily based on a conversation I had some months ago, precisely a few days before the attacks in Paris, with a U.K. film director interested in the current developments in Syria and Iraq, i.e., the emergence of the Islamic State, a.k.a. ISIS or ISIL. The director wanted to have my opinion about the economic strength of the Islamic State; he was very well informed about the current war developments in Syria and Iraq. But, like many other researchers and journalists, he had a sort of “worried excitement” in relation to the Islamic State. I told him that I was expecting other terrorist attacks across the globe — a few days later occurred the Parisian attacks — but that with reference to the economic power of the Islamic State I was quite skeptical at least as for the possibility of establishing a real and functioning state in the areas under the Islamic State’s control. After some months, I am still deeply convinced that at the economic level the Islamic State does not have good prospects. Let’s see why.

In Iraq, the effective territorial prominence of the Islamic State started in early 2014, when during its western Iraq offensive, a.k.a. as the Anbar offensive, the Islamic State was able to push Iraq’s government forces out of key Iraqi cities. After that offensive, on June 10, 2014, the group captured Mosul, a city home to 2.5 million people and a relevant center for crude oil production located in northern Iraq. In Syria, during the Syrian Civil War, in 2013, the city of Al Raqqah was captured by the Islamic State, which in 2014 made this city its headquarters in Syria. Raqqah is the de facto capital of the territory under Islamic State’s control in Iraq and Syria. In brief, the Islamic State currently controls a vast area straddling between eastern Syria and western Iraq. In specific, the Islamic State controls vast areas of the following governorates:

  • in Syria: Aleppo, Al Raqqah, Deir ez-Zour, Homs, and Rif Dimashq

  • in Iraq: Al Anbar, Saladin, Kirkuk and Nineveh


Theoretically, approximately 10 million people should live in the Islamic State-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria — exactly twice as much the population of the Kurdistan Regional Government (the K.R.G.), which according to K.R.G. cabinet sources stands at 10.2 million people. It’s important to understand that both in Iraq and Syria there are large swaths of territory where, although it does not have direct control, the Islamic State is completely free to operate. According to U.N. reports, 4.8 million Syrians have been forced to flee abroad, primarily to Turkey (2.7 million) and Lebanon (registered 1 million but the refugees are probably 1.5 million exerting a huge impact on the already not brilliant Lebanese economy). In Iraq, still according to U.N. data, there should be more than 3 million people who are now internally displaced.

Since its apogee in the summer of 2014, the Islamic State has lost around 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and 10 to 20 percent of its territory in Syria. According to the latest U.S. intelligence estimates, the present number of Islamic State recruits is put at 25,000; indeed, there has been a consistent decline in the number of recruits over the previous months, although in light of the contingent situation in both Iraq and Syria, these statistics are not a 100 percent reliable. A total of 25,000 Islamic State fighters have been killed by the U.S.-led airstrikes in the region. But, unless Western countries decide to scale up their intervention, with all the unknown possible outcomes that may derive from a Western presence on the ground, reconquering the lost cities in Iraq is a very lengthy process. For instance, Ramadi, in Iraq, was reconquered by Iraq’s government forces only after an offensive that lasted several months. In Syria, where getting some sense of the civil war, an ongoing multi-sided armed conflict with international interventions, is even more complicated, trying to stabilize the country is right now almost an impossible task.

Is the Islamic State Rich? It Depends From What It Means to Be Rich  

It goes by itself that the Islamic State needs money in order to:

  • fight in Iraq and Syria

  • manage the territory it controls in Iraq and Syria

  • conduct terrorist attacks in other countries

The difference between the Islamic State and some other terrorist groups is that it controls a vast territory. And from this territory, it derives several revenue channels. It is on a grand scale a replica of what happens in some cities across the globe (for instance, Caracas, San Pedro Sula, San Salvador) where the police do not dare to enter some neighborhoods because it would be outgunned — in other words in these cities as well as in the Islamic State-controlled territory the official rule of law is not applied. Having a precise estimate of the Islamic State’s revenues is not easy because these local revenue channels may vary consistently from month to month. At the time of this writing, three are the most important sources of revenue: taxes and property confiscation (together around 50 percent), and the sale of crude oil (43 percent). The latter was initially the most important of the Islamic State’s revenues. Other sources of financing are the sale of antiquities, drug smuggling, banks reserves, ransom for hostages, and donations. When the Islamic State conquered Mosul, it found something like half billion dollars in the Mosul branch of Iraq’s Central Bank, but of course this was a one-time revenue source.

According to the Rand Corporation, a U.S. policy think tank, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Islamic State earned around $1 million per day, while in 2014 it was able to collect an amount ranging from $1 million to $3 million per day. So, assuming that the Islamic State is able to collect $3 million per day, this is equivalent to $90 million per month (best case scenario for the terrorist group). But, these estimates are too optimistic. In fact, I.H.S., a consultancy, reported that as of March 2016, the Islamic State’s revenue per month experienced a 30 percent decrease to $56 million from a value of $80 million per month in mid-2015.


These numbers tell us one main thing: $56 million per month, but it would be the same if the Islamic State still collected $90 million, is a high amount of money in order to carry out terrorist operations around the world, but it is absolutely insufficient in order to run a territory that the Islamic State would like to transform into a fully fledged country. Managing a territory is a much more complex and expensive task. For instance, the K.R.G.’s population is practically half the Islamic State’s population. And, the Kurdish government estimates that to manage the K.R.G., an autonomous province within Iraq, it needs $850 million to $1 billion per month, which should be equivalent to the 17 percent of the federal budget. The Iraqi Constitution assigns 17 percent of the federal budget to the K.R.G. Today, between Erbil and Baghdad there is again a strong confrontation as for the distribution of the revenue obtained from selling the K.R.G.’s and Iraq proper’s oil via the Kurdish pipeline — in March 2016, Iraq’s central government decided to stop its oil exports via the Kurdish pipeline system (more details below) because of disagreements with the K.R.G. on oil revenues. In both the K.R.G. and Iraq proper, under the current strained circumstances (a war against the Islamic State, low oil prices, and 3 million of internally displaced people), it’s quite improbable that the budget may permit Baghdad to transfer $1 billion a month to Erbil, but at least it gives us an idea of the financial burden required to run a country of 5.2 million people in that area of the Middle East — although it’s true that geography of the K.R.G and that of the Islamic State territory is quite different (mountain vs. desert plain). The fact that, in 2015, the Islamic State approved a budget of $2 billion confirms that its revenues are not comparable to the revenues of a standard country.

So the real question is whether the Islamic State has abundant economic resources to at least barely run a territory spanning between Iraq and Syria. And the answer is no. The economic means that it has right now at its disposal are absolutely not sufficient. Resorting to terrorism — although a constant in Iraq’s life after the fall of Saddam Hussein — is a manifestation of a weak position versus adversaries more powerful; adversaries who cannot be won in an open political confrontation or in a fight according to international humanitarian law (I.H.L.), a.k.a., jus in bello.        

In addition to these economic considerations, after the immediate fall of Saddam Hussein and during the years of Nouri Al Maliki’s government (2006-14), the Islamic State partially found fertile ground in Iraq thanks to the disenfranchisement of the Iraqi Sunni population, around 35 percent of Iraq’s population — an important caveat: some Sunni groups helped the invasion of Iraq by the Western powers, but later they were never rewarded for their help by the new Iraqi administration. Instead, during Saddam Hussein’s period, Sunnis were the majority of the Ba’athist government and enjoyed a special treatment. In brief, today the economic conditions of most Sunnis in Iraq are at the root of their support for the Islamic State. In fact, apart from some areas in Baghdad and the city of Mosul, most of Iraq’s Sunnis are farmers, who have been hit hard by the poor harvests and food shortages of the last years — in Iraq, after 2003, agricultural productivity declined by 90 percent. In other words, poverty and political marginalization pushed many Sunnis toward the Islamic State. In the Middle East, the identitarian affiliation has always been a very powerful political tool. Especially when life is harsh and the future is bleak, the normal behavior is to more tightly embrace one’s identitarian affiliation, no matter whether the basic ideology is not supported a 100 percent. This is exactly what happened between the disenfranchised Sunnis and the Islamic State ideology.

The Islamic State and the Sale of Crude Oil

As mentioned above, the Islamic State obtains half of its revenues from taxation and confiscation in the territory it controls. It’s evident that the wider territory it controls and the more people live in that territory, the higher are the rents for the Islamic State. Over the last year the Islamic State has lost ground in both Iraq and Syria, so it has now a reduced taxable base. Despite the importance of taxation and confiscation, I would like to develop some considerations on the relation between the Islamic State and the sale of crude oil. The reason behind this choice is that last fall during my conversation with the film director a lot of attention was given to the flow of revenues the Islamic State obtains from crude oil sales — in addition to this, I am a petroleum consultant (legal and fiscal issues), while I do not know much about selling antiquities, smuggling drugs and so on.

A petro-state is a country that depends on petroleum for:

  • 50 percent or more of export revenues

  • 25 percent or more of G.D.P.

  • 25 percent or more of government revenues

Under this definition, the Islamic State may well be defined as a petro-state. Putting aside considerations about whether it’s good for a country to be a petro-state (also the well managed Norway is a petro-state), the real issue is that the Islamic State is a “very poor” petro-state. In other words, its petroleum revenue is insufficient to administer the territory it controls. Revenues are insufficient today, when the Islamic State approximately produces 21,000 bbl/d, and were insufficient in 2014 and 2015 when its production was higher — in August 2014, before the beginning of the U.S. airstrikes production hovered around 70,000 bbl/d.

For the petroleum industry, the advance of the Islamic State has created a lot of economic damage, especially in Iraq — Syria is today a minor oil producer at the world level. Luckily the Islamic State has completely been unable to reach two out three of Iraq’s main oil-producing areas, i.e., southern Iraq and the K.R.G. The third area, Kirkuk Province, sees the presence of both Kurdish forces and Islamic State forces, but the most important oil fields, technically still under federal jurisdiction, are under Kurdish control. As a result of the presence of the Islamic State in central and western Iraq, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has in operation only the section related to the Turkish part from Fishkhabur (Iraq-Turkey border) to the port city of Ceyhan in Turkey. The Iraqi section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (from Kirkuk to Fishkhabur) has been out of service since March 2014 as a consequence of repeated militant attacks. In fact, this pipeline runs through Islamic State-controlled territory. So, since May 2014, the K.R.G. has been exporting its crude oil to Turkey via its new Kurdish pipeline system, which is connected to the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. This new Kurdish pipeline system was then expanded from Khurmala to the Avana dome in the Kirkuk area with the express goal of facilitating export from the Makhmour, Avana and Kirkuk area fields. In fact, these fields had been unable to export since March 2014 because the standard Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline had been damaged by the Islamic State.


In the territory the Islamic State has conquered in both Iraq and Syria, it has the control of practically all the oil fields and the related infrastructure, but it may use them only in a very limited way. In fact, since August 2014, the U.S.-led airstrikes have consistently reduced oil extraction inflicting a lot of damages to the oil industry. In specific, Operation Tidal Wave II, a U.S.-led military operation that started at the end of October 2015, targeted oil transport, refining and distribution facilities and infrastructure under the Islamic State control. According to the U.S. forces, in just two months, Operation Tidal Way II destroyed 90 percent of the Islamic State’s oil production. In addition to this, the Islamic State has also to face the difficulty of substituting aging as well as broken infrastructure. Similarly, it is not easy to find engineers and technicians able to operate the oil fields — the call for recruiting these types of professionals started immediately during the advance of the spring/summer of 2014. The way the group managed the Baiji refinery, which is 130 miles north of Baghdad, well testifies to these difficulties. The refinery had a capacity of 170,000 bbl/d and supplied petroleum products for northern Iraq. After the Islamic State captured the refinery in June 2014, the refinery started to produce only a fraction of its rated capacity because of lack of personnel and oil supply — Iraqi forces retook the refinery five months later.


As mentioned above, the Islamic State is experiencing a reduction in its overall oil production. It’s currently producing around 21,000 bbl/d. It’s quite evident that in order to move this oil the Islamic State has to use exclusively trucks. But shipping oil by truck is an expensive means, especially when oil prices are low. Tank trucks are described by their size or volume capacity. Large trucks typically have a capacity ranging from 20,800 liters to 43,900 liters. The present capacity of the Islamic State could be moved with as many as 76 43,900-liter tank trucks.

Furthermore, in light of its illegality, this oil has necessarily to sell at a discount. As a means of comparison, last year when prices averaged $52 a barrel, the K.R.G. was able to cash in $36 a barrel, while in February 2016, when Brent was $32 a barrel, the K.R.G. cashed in $20 a barrel. Of course, although in Baghdad someone might dissent on this point, for a potential buyer one thing is to buy from the K.R.G. and one completely different thing is to buy from a terrorist organization. In other words, the oil of the Islamic State should be consistently sold at an important discount in comparison to Brent. Reliable data are not available, but it has been reported that the Islamic State’s oil from Syria sold at as little as $18 per barrel when Brent sold at $107 per barrel.

In brief, part of the Islamic State’s oil is sold on the black market along the very much permeable borders between the Islamic State and the neighboring countries. The Islamic State primarily refines oil in small rudimentary mobile refineries having a capacity of 300 to 500 barrels per day. Also this refined oil is shipped to Turkey via truck, although some of this oil has been sold to the Syrian regime — pecunia non olet. Refining has always been a problem for the Islamic State because by October 2014, 50 percent of its refining capacity had been destroyed by the U.S.-led airstrikes. Moreover, in both Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State gets profits as well from selling oil to its captive markets at a price higher than the one obtained when exporting oil abroad. And in Iraq and Syria, people desperately need oil for their daily activities; in many areas diesel generators are essential because otherwise there would be no electricity. 



When assessing the Islamic State, the most important first step is to decide whether to consider it a state or a terrorist organization. If the Islamic State is state, it is indeed a poor and dysfunctional state. It may control a territory straddling between eastern Syria and western Iraq, but it will always be difficult for this hybrid state to consolidate its position. A state in order to thrive needs a functioning economy, which is something that the Islamic State completely lacks. Instead, its economy is a looting economy, i.e., an economy based on the indiscriminate taking of goods by force as part of its military victories. Continuing with looting activities (the present futile taxations based on the Islamic State-imposed new norms are nothing more than disguised looting) after several months is a clear sign that the Islamic State will never succeed in establishing a normal state. Instead, if the Islamic State is a terrorist organization, it is indeed a very rich organization in relation to its terrorist activities. Indeed, it’s an organization that has the economic capabilities of committing atrocities in several countries. Especially now, in light of the recent difficulties in the Iraqi theater, it is highly probable that Islamic State terrorists will continue to export to other countries the present Iraqi-Syrian mess. The oil business is a very complex and complicated business, so, since the beginning of its territorial expansion, it was out of question that the Islamic State, a terrorist organization, could have continued developing Iraq’s and Syria’s petroleum sector — this idea was already even more clear after the beginning of the U.S.-led airstrikes. In other words, from an economic point of view, the Islamic State may implement only one technique: pillaging.

Friday, June 3, 2016

Brazil’s Petroleum Regulatory Framework and the Necessity to Develop a Methodology to Assess the Economic Viability of the Libra Field P.S.C.


June 2, 2016


Brazil’s petroleum fiscal structure is one of the most complex petroleum systems at the world level. The country has a petroleum regulatory framework based on concessionary agreements, production sharing contracts (P.S.C.s), and offshore areas where Petrobras, Brazil’s semi-public multinational petroleum corporation, has for a period of 40 years the right to extract up to 5 billion barrels of oil equivalent (b.o.e.). This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, after a description of Brazil’s current oil production, it’s developed an analysis of Brazil’s petroleum fiscal structure. In the second part, the paper delineates a five-step methodology in order to assess the economic viability of the Libra oil field P.S.C. (additional research is necessary in order to collect all the data required by the five-step model), and it presents some preliminary considerations concerning the economic viability of the Libra P.S.C.

PART I — Brazil’s Oil Production (E.I.A. Data for 2014)

In 2014, Brazil produced 2.95 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of petroleum and other liquids. This quantity makes Brazil the world’s 9th-largest producer (in specific, the third in the Americas after the U.S. and Canada). These 2.95 million bbl/d are divided in 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil, 551,000 bbl/d of biofuels, and the remainder as condensate (a low-density, high-A.P.I. gravity liquid hydrocarbon that generally occurs in association with natural gas) and natural gas liquids (N.G.L.s, i.e., ethane, propane, butane, isobutane, and pentane). The state of Rio de Janeiro produced 1.54 million bbl/d in 2014, so it approximately accounts for 68.4 percent of Brazil’s total production.


Year after year, Brazil is increasing its crude oil production from offshore oil deposits in the pre-salt layer; in April 2015 pre-salt crude oil made up a quarter of Brazil’s total output. And in July 2015, when new oil fields in the Santos Basin came onstream, oil production from the pre-salt deposits reached 865,000 bbl/d. The production of crude oil from the pre-salt deposits has consistently increased over the last eight years. In fact, when it started in 2008, the production was only around 0.4 million bbl/d.

Notwithstanding the positive results of the last years, Brazil consumes more petroleum and other liquid fuels than it is able to produce. For instance, in 2014, Brazilian demand for crude oil and other liquid fuels was 3.2 million bbl/d (3.0 million bbl/d in 2013). According to the Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.), it’s possible that already in 2016 production could exceed consumption. At the same time, it’s worth noting that, in addition to the current low oil prices, this forecast is highly uncertain as well in light of the high corporate debt and the corruption scandal involving Petrobras, which is Brazil’s semi-public multinational petroleum corporation. These three factors may adversely affect future development and current production. Petrobras is presently under investigation in Brazil and the U.S. for bribery and money laundering. As further proof of the fact that there could be difficulties achieving a complete self-reliance any time soon, in 2014 Petrobras invested $27.4 billion, which represented a 17 percent reduction in comparison to the value invested in 2013. The current financial difficulties are a turning point because, until 2007, Petrobras’ operating cash flows had always been sufficient to pay all the capital expenditures; and the company had never needed to raise new equity capital over the previous 30 years. For more information about Petrobras and corruption, please read the four slides “Operation Car Wash” below.





In Brazil, the new most-promising frontier area for oil exploration and production is represented by the offshore pre-salt oil fields running for about 800 km at approximately 250 kilometers from Brazil’s southeastern coast. This pre-salt oil is located at a depth of 7,000 meters: 2,000 meters of Atlantic Ocean water and 5,000 meters of a thick layer of rock and salt; this layer of salt complicates extraction but has conserved the hydrocarbons without leakage. All these characteristics make extraction quite expensive and requiring top-notch offshore production expertise. Brazil’s pre-salt oil has an A.P.I. grade of 27 degrees coupled with a low sulfur composition. 

In 2005, Petrobras drilled exploratory wells near the Tupi field (250 kilometers off the coast of Rio de Janeiro), today called the Lula field, and discovered hydrocarbons below the layer of salt. Then in 2007, a consortium of Petrobras, BG Group, and Petrogal drilled still in the Tupi field and discovered an estimated 5 to 8 billion barrels of oil equivalent (b.o.e.), at 18,000 feet below the ocean surface. Additional exploration showed that pre-salt hydrocarbon deposits should extend through the Santos, Campos and Espirito Santo offshore basins. Some pilot projects started in 2009 and 2010. All the pre-salt areas currently in the development phase have not been competitively granted to Petrobras. Then, in October 2013, the government of Brazil conducted its first pre-salt licensing round for the Libra field, which should hold, according to initial estimates, between 8 to 12 billion barrels of recoverable reserves.


PART I — The Regulatory Framework — The Concession Regime

The Brazilian upstream oil and gas sector was opened to private companies in 1997, when Law 9,478 (a.k.a. the Oil Act) was promulgated. In fact, before the publication of this law, the upstream sector was completely under the monopoly of Petrobras, originally a state-owned company (created in 1953) that later became majority-owned by the state. Today, the government directly owns 50.3 percent of Petrobras’ common shares (those with voting rights), while the Brazilian Development Bank and Brazil’s Fundo Soberano (a sovereign wealth fund, S.W.F.) control a 10 percent share; adding up all the three government-related components, the government has around a 60 percent ownership (direct and indirect).

When Petrobras was established, it was given the monopoly on oil and gas exploration and production activities. But, after the oil crisis in 1973, President Geisel of Brazil, authorized Petrobras to enter into risk contracts with I.O.C.s. So, prior to the Constitution of 1988, which closed Brazil’s upstream sector to I.O.C.s, Brazil’s petroleum sector included Petrobras as well as several I.O.C.s (among them Shell, Exxon, Texaco, BP, Elf, and Total).

Already the Constitution of 1966 had given the petroleum monopoly constitutional status, but it hadn’t mentioned how this monopoly should have been exercised. Then, the Constitution of 1988 introduced some more restrictive provisions effectively establishing the monopoly and the prohibition of contracting with other companies. Article 177 of the Constitution of 1988, expressly prohibited I.O.C.s from acting in Brazil with reference to the exploration of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons fluids. Today, Article 177 of the Constitution, as amended in 1995, still affirms that the prospecting, exploration and production of petroleum are a monopoly of the federal government, but it also permits the government to contract state-owned as well as private companies for the execution of those activities.


Law 9,478 created the Brazilian Oil Agency (A.N.P.), which is the regulatory body in charge of the supervision and regulation of the petroleum sector. At the same time, this law decided that Brazil’s upstream petroleum sector would be regulated by concessionary agreements following public biddings to which both Petrobras and foreign companies were entitled to participate. The basic requirement is that companies and/or consortiums meet the legal, technical and financial requirements established by the A.N.P. The exploration risk pertains to the concessionaire, which has ownership of the produced oil and is also entitled to export it; the concessionaire has to pay taxes and royalties.   


The acquisition of the exploration and production rights may be direct via participation in the bidding rounds organized by the A.N.P. or indirect via the acquisition of a participation interest in a block previously assigned to other companies. The indirect option requires the approval of the A.N.P. The petroleum areas where Petrobras was already working before Law 9,478 were left to the company (Round Zero of concession). Then, in 1999 the A.N.P. organized Round 1, which indeed was the actual opening of the Brazilian petroleum sector – 11 companies won concessions agreements. Over the subsequent years, until 2008, the A.N.P. held other 10 concessionary rounds. All these rounds gave positive results, and, between 2001 and 2011, Brazil increased its oil production by almost 1 million bbl/d to 2.2 million bbl/d and more than doubled its gas production to 16.7 billion metric cube. In the last three years, Brazil has organized three other bidding rounds for concession agreements, two in 2013 and one in October 2015. The last one (the 13th round), held in October 2015 and offering 266 oil blocks fell significantly short of the expectations because the country managed to sell only 37 blocks. Almost 40 companies had qualified, but then only 17 submitted bids (and of these 17, 11 were Brazilian). As possible reasons for the bad results, it’s probable worth mentioning the low oil prices and Petrobras’ decision not to participate in the bidding round.     

In order to choose the winning bidders, the A.N.P. uses a formula that encompasses the following three criteria (variable with reference to their numbers and percentages according to the specific bidding round):

  • The amount of the signature bonus

  • The minimum exploratory program

  • The local content offered by each bidder

Local content requirement is a very important element of every petroleum contract in Brazil. It consists of the obligation for the oil companies to give preference to Brazilian suppliers and to reach a minimum percentage of its exploration and development expenditures using Brazilian suppliers. In order not to permit to inefficient companies to be awarded contracts, local suppliers have preference only when there is an equivalence between their price, delivery timeframe and quality, and those of foreign suppliers. These local content policy requirements exist since Round Zero, but after 2005 the controls are more serious. 

The oil companies have to pay the government:

  • The signature bonus (immediately when winning the bidding round)

  • A retention fee proportional to the size of the concession area

  • A 10 percent royalty calculated on the production of oil and gas

  • A special participation for blocks that have high levels of production or profitability

  • Income tax

The ownership of the oil and gas produced becomes property of the concessionaire once the hydrocarbons pass through the measurement point.

A Brazilian concession is composed of two distinct phases:

  • The Exploration Phase — It cannot last more than 7 years, which can be divided into two sub-periods; the second sub-period is optional. Over the course of this phase, the concessionaries must perform the minimum exploratory program (seismic activities and possibly drill at least one exploratory well). This phase includes the appraisal of a discovery (of course, if a discovery does occur).  

  • The Production Phase — It usually may last up to 27 years, and it starts after completion of the minimum exploratory program. Production begins after a declaration of commerciality, which follows the completion of the appraisal of the discovery.


According to Law 9,478, the assignment or transfer of a concession, fully or partially, may occur on condition that the assignee covers the technical, financial and legal requirements set forth by the A.N.P. in the concession contract and previously in the bidding round. 

After the promulgation of Law 9,478 (the Oil Act), in order to obtain the necessary economic resources, Petrobras sought partners via farm-out agreements and project financing structures. In practice, with farm-out agreements Petrobras sold a participatory interest in areas that it had obtained via a concession agreement. In Brazil, project financing structures have played a very important role at the end of 1990s.

In specific, at that time, Petrobras desperately needed cash, but its possibility of raising debt via normal debt instruments was strongly curtailed by Brazil’s agreements with the International Monetary Fund (the I.M.F.). Similarly, the federal government had its hands tied as for providing Petrobras with new funds. So, it was developed an off-balance mechanism (for instance, in relation to the Marlim field) in order that neither Petrobras’ leverage ratio, nor the federal government’s public debt limit was affected. It was created a joint venture between Petrobras and an S.P.C. (special purpose corporation). The joint venture had no interest in the concession, but it was responsible for raising debt to pay for the asset to use in a specific field. Later, when revenues started, the S.P.C. would receive for instance 30 percent of the field’s revenues. Today, reserve-based lending is another possibility. It consists of a type of financing in which a loan is secured by the oil and gas undeveloped reserves of a borrower. The facility is subsequently repaid using the proceeds deriving from the sales of the producing fields.         

PART I — The Regulatory Framework — The Production Sharing Contracts (P.S.C.s)

After relevant legislative debates and thanks to the pressure of the Workers’ Party, in 2010, the Brazilian Congress established a new regulatory framework based on the utilization of production sharing contracts (P.S.C.s) instead of concessionary agreements for the petroleum operations in the pre-salt areas.

The framework is based on the following three laws:

  • Law 12,276 of 2010, regarding the “onerous assignment”, i.e., the direct grant of areas to Petrobras with the aim of capitalizing Petrobras.

  • Law 12,304 of 2010, authorizing the establishment of a new state-owned company called Empresa Brasileira de Administraçáo de Petróleo e Gás Natural (P.P.S.A.), whose main roles are to manage and supervise P.S.C.s and to represent the government in project operating committees.

  • Law 12,351 of 2010, a.k.a., the Pre-Salt Law, defining the Brazilian P.S.C.s for the pre-salt areas and for other strategic areas of Brazil.   

As a result of the three new laws, in Brazil there are now two different legal frameworks for the petroleum sector, i.e., concessions and P.S.C.s, and geography (the location of the petroleum field) is the real parameter deciding which one of the two regimes has to apply. It’s debatable whether the onerous assignment may be considered a third framework. In fact, thanks to Law 12,276, in September 2010, the Federal Union passed to Petrobras the right to explore for 40 years up to 5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in six designated pre-salt areas and one contingent area (Transfer of Rights Contract).



The idea and the expectations of large petroleum reserves located in the pre-salt areas, pushed many Brazilian states to discuss the way oil and gas royalties were distributed within the federation. Under the push of the non-producing states, Law 12,734, which improved the position of the non-producing states to the detriment of the petroleum-producing states, was passed in November 2012. The constitutionality of this law was immediately challenged by some of the producing states, and the Federal Supreme Court granted an injunction suspending the effects of the law until its final decision — still today this law is only partially applied.      

The Brazilian P.S.C.s are classic P.S.C.s where the contractor will carry out and pay for the exploration at its own risk and expense.


All the exploration activities will be completely paid for by Petrobras and its joint-venture partners. Later, in case of a commercial discovery, the contractor will be reimbursed for the exploration and production costs, the so called Cost Oil (certified by the P.P.S.A.), and will obtain a percentage (as per the contract) of Profit Oil.

PROFIT OIL = Total Revenues – Royalties —  Cost Oil

Article 4 of Law 12,351 stipulates that Petrobras is the sole operator of the P.S.C.s (all phases included). The award of the P.S.C.s may be done directly to Petrobras (no auction) or to a consortium of private companies via a bidding procedure. If it is chosen the second procedure, Petrobras will have a minimum participating interest of 30 percent in every single block in the pre-salt and the strategic areas. This means that it will be the remaining 70 percent to be awarded to other companies under a competitive bidding round. The winning companies will form a consortium with Petrobras (and P.P.S.A.). If Petrobras deems it relevant to its business strategy, it may compete by itself or under a joint bidding arrangement to increase its 30 percent mandatory share to up to 100 percent.

P.P.S.A. will not take any risks nor make any investments, but, on behalf of the government, it will participate in the P.S.C.s; chair the operating committee with a 50 percent vote and a veto power; administer the contracts; after contacting trading agents manage the commercialization of the federal government’s petroleum produced in the pre-salt and strategic areas; and represent the federal government in the unitization procedures. Occasionally, the federal government has the right to directly participate in the investment (in addition to Petrobras). In such a case, the government will assume the risks in proportion to its share and later will be entitled to the corresponding cost oil and profit oil. It should be underlined that, at least under the first P.S.C. (the Libra P.S.C.), it is not envisaged a government share before the execution of the contract, and after the execution, an eventual government share would be subject to the approval of the contractors, which would assign part of their shares to the government.    

One important difference between the concession agreements and the P.S.C.s is that the signature bonus in relation to the latter is determined in advance by the P.S.C., so it’s not one of the criteria used to establish the winners of the bidding rounds. The Brazilian P.S.C.s are granted on the basis of the offered highest share of profit oil (as a function of the Brent price and the envisaged daily production per producing well) given to the government; this is the only criteria used.   

Law 12,351 created a social fund for social and regional development. In specific, it will be used for combating poverty, developing education, culture, sport activities, public health, science and technology, and the environment. In addition, the social fund should provide long-term savings ready to stabilize fluctuations in income and prices for that part of the national economy linked to petroleum operations (volatility, finiteness and a relevant impact on a national economy are the three main characteristics of petroleum activities).

Apart from the Libra field, which will be analyzed in detail below, until now all the pre-salt areas under development have been directly assigned to Petrobras. In fact, through the Transfer of Rights Agreement of 2010, the government gave Petrobras the right to explore and produce 5 billion b.o.e. from six pre-salt areas in the Santos Basin. Later in 2014, the government gave Petrobras the right to produce surplus volumes estimated at 9.8 to 15.2 billion b.o.e.

PART I — Doubts About What Petrobras Can Do and What It Cannot Do

Also if the oil price were higher and Petrobras were not involved in any corruption scandal, there would be some doubts as for Petrobras’ proficiency in implementing projects as complex as those related to the pre-salt fields. In fact, the company may not have the required financial and human resources. Moreover, given its size, the company could not be well suited for the development of some small pre-salt projects, which, instead, an independent more agile producer could bring forward in an efficient way. Another danger for Petrobras could be its minimum 30 percent interest because it’s sufficient that a specific deposit gives a less positive return on investment (R.O.I.) in order to produce relevant losses to Petrobras. For more information about Petrobras and corruption, please refer to the four slides “Operation Car Wash” above.


PART II — The Libra Field P.S.C. — A General Description

In October 2013, the government of Brazil concluded its first, and until today unique, pre-salt licensing round. This bidding round was about the Libra field (1,550 square kilometers), located in the Santos Basin at a water depth of around 2,000 meters and estimated to hold 8 to 12 billion barrels of recoverable oil — according to the Ministry of Mines and Energy there should be 120 billion cubic meters of natural gas as well. The A.N.P. would like to obtain a production target of at least one million bbl/d.


Despite 11 companies had confirmed their interest in the auction, only one consortium participated in the bidding, and consequently it won. Many world top-class players with reference to deep-water operations were absent — for instance, British Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Chevron. In addition, there was the idea that there could have been at least a couple of consortiums where Asian companies would have owned a relevant part of the shares. In general, when in an auction there is a single bid only, it is not a good sign for the organizing country, because it has probably missed out on the power of a real competitive auction to raise more economic resources to the government.  

Under the terms of the auction, Petrobras was supposed to be a partner with at least a 30 percent stake in every participating consortium while the consortium had to guarantee at least 41.6 percent of profit oil to the government (for an oil price between $100 to $120 a barrel and a production per well of 10,000 bbl/d to 12,000 bbl/d). It was envisaged a signature bonus of $6.5 billion.    

Five companies are part of the winning consortium. They are:

  • Petrobras (40 percent)

  • Royal Dutch Shell (20 percent)

  • Total (20 percent)

  • China National Petroleum Corporation (C.N.P.C.) (10 percent)

  • China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Cnooc) (10 percent)

Indeed, it’s a challenging composition. Apart from Petrobras, which has to be a participant in every Brazilian P.S.C., on the one side there are two European supermajors, Royal Dutch Shell and Total, which are completely business-oriented companies, while on the other side there are two Chinese government companies, C.N.P.C. and Cnooc, whose primary goal is to have access to new petroleum resources on behalf of the Chinese government.

PART II — The Libra Field P.S.C. —  Building a Correct Analytical Framework

The table below shows a SWOT analysis for the Libra field performed by Ernst and Young.


This SWOT analysis captures the environment of the Libra field, but it’s too general, as a SWOT analysis many times is. In fact, there are no coherent economic principles underlying it. In practice, a SWOT analysis turns out to be too often a biased list of items. Summing up, this SWOT analysis may be a good starting point, but then a different analysis should be performed.

Indeed, negotiating a fair and balanced petroleum contract between a government and a company or a consortium of companies is never a simple exercise. In fact, there are many variables involved (the most important of which is always the price of oil) and the contract has to last for several decades — with reference to the Libra field for 35 years. In other words, it’s quite possible that the contract may provide both sides with a positive economic result in year X, while instead the contract could be completely unacceptable to one of the two parties in year Y — for instance, if, in year Y, one side is reaping windfall profits, while the other side does not get similar positive results. And when a party is dissatisfied with the result, the continuation of a contract is not simple. Although it’s not a desired outcome, the parties may be forced to a contract renegotiation, which is always a lengthy and complicated task. The worst case scenario is the government nationalization of the petroleum sector or of a specific company or project. This type of legal outcome has occurred several times since the beginning of the petroleum industry; recently it’s worth mentioning the case of the renationalization of YPF in Argentina.

With reference to a business activity, and the petroleum sector is no exception, the real starting point has to be the basic formula:


In a petroleum contract, it’s important that the government and the I.O.C.s work always with the goal of doing profits. Sometimes governments, in light of their public role, may implement business operations where profitability is directly missing. But at a careful assessment, the missing profitability is compensated by public good gains in other sectors, so that we may speak of an indirect profitability. With reference to the Libra field, the necessity to the government of obtaining profits is reinforced by the presence of Petrobras (40 percent share in the project, the operator of the consortium), which is under a 6o percent total government ownership (direct and indirect). And, Petrobras has a working participation because it contributes its share of costs since the beginning of the operations, so Petrobras should focus its attention on making profits. 

In order to understand the profitability of an oil project, the first step is to delineate a pre-tax cash flow analysis (based on certain economic assumptions) as exemplified by the following formula:




For an I.O.C.  it’s quite logic that net cash flow before taxes need to be positive in order to barely start thinking of going ahead with a petroleum project. The slide below developed by Alistair Watson and OpenOil shows an invented example of a petroleum net cash flow before taxes.


According to who performs the analysis there could be different names in relation to the costs categories, but the logic of the costs components is always the same.

Once obtained the net cash flow before taxes, it is necessary to add to this value the fiscal parameters required by the country’s laws. Without inserting the fiscal parameters, net cash flows before taxes, although positive, are completely useless.

In the case of the Libra field, the necessary fiscal parameters are:

  • Royalty — A 15 percent fixed royalty with reference to the production value.

  • Cost Oil Recovery Limit — The contractors are entitled to recover cost oil on a monthly basis: 50 percent of the gross amount of production during the first two years and 30 percent in the subsequent years.  Under the current provision there will be no adjustment for inflation on the balance of cost oil account.

  • Government Share of Profit Oil — 41.6 percent minimum profit oil share variable according to a sliding scale table based on the price of oil and production per well. This is a progressive tool.     

  • Income Tax — 34 percent on the cost oil and profit oil income of the contractor. 

  • Depreciation of Development Costs — It could be correct to assume a depreciation between 5 to 10 percent in line with industry trends.

  • State Participation — Not present at the moment.

Once we add the fiscal parameters, it’s likely to have a better idea of the profitability of the project, but there are still two important parameters missing:

  • Time Value of Money and

  • Risk.

The net cash flow before taxes formula may be calculated as a Single Period Model or as an Annualized Model. The latter can evaluate the timing of the cash flows and then apply a discount rate in order to calculate the Net Present Value (N.P.V.) and the Internal Rate of Return (I.R.R.). In fact, money received or paid at different times is like different currencies, so to put together cash flows occurring at different timeframes, it’s necessary to apply a Discount Rate, i.e., the Rate of Return (R) offered by investment alternatives in the capital markets of equivalent risks. The Net Present Value Rule says to accept all project with positive N.P.V. and to reject all the project with negative N.P.V. The Internal Rate of Return of a project is the one discount rate such that the net present value of the project’s free cash flows equals zero. The I.R.R. Rule says to accept all projects whose I.R.R.>R and to reject all projects whose I.R.R.<R.

One final necessary calculation is to include in the analysis the Expected Net Present Value (E.N.P.V., a.k.a. Expected Monetary Value, E.M.V.). In fact, the above calculations have assumed that the exploration is successful, but drilling success rates for offshore projects are in the order of 10 to 20 percent. A company has to carry out an E.N.P.V. calculation, which is obtained through the following formula:

E.N.P.V. = (Discounted N.P.V.)   (Percentage of Success) — (Minimum Exploration Costs)  (Percentage of Failure)

If the result of the above formula is negative, the project does not have to go ahead.

Only at this point, it’s possible to have an idea whether the project may make economic sense or not. But, of course, it is recommended that companies carry out a thorough sensitivity analysis with reference to the most central parameters, of which the most important is the oil price. It’s quite evident that if the price of a barrel of oil is $100 is one thing, while if the price of a barrel of oil is $90, $70, or $50 is another thing as for the economic performance of a project.

Similarly, estimates of the total Libra field size are between a minimum of 4 billion barrels and a maximum of 15 billion barrels. It’s probable that total production could range between 5 billion barrels and 12.5 billion barrels. Another big question mark is the number of required wells (some are producing wells while some others have to inject water) and their productivity (from less than 4,000 barrels to more than 24,000 barrels a day).


Summing up, the proposed methodology, consisting of five consecutive analytical steps, i.e., net cash flows before taxes, fiscal parameters, N.P.V. & I.R.R., E.N.P.V and sensitivity analysis, is a good procedure to evaluate whether a project is profitable because it permits analysts to develop several different scenarios changing the various parameters.   

PART II — The Libra Field P.S.C. —  Additional Parameters

Under the first presalt production sharing agreement, the government set the local content requirement for the Libra field at:

  • 37 percent in the exploration phase,

  • 55 percent in the development phase, and

  • 59 percent after 2022.

The contractors are requested to purchase as much as 65 percent of their goods and services from Brazilian companies. The thresholds mentioned above are indeed very high, and, over the last years, the I.O.C.s working in Brazil have complained about the country’s lack of domestic capacity to meet these requirements. This will be even more difficult with the exploration and development of the pre-salt fields with their complicated technicalities (ultra-deepwater fields want sophisticated technology, which is not always present in Brazil, although the country has a relevant experience drilling in deep and ultra-deep water). Local corruption adds to the already complicated local content requirements and adds up to costs overruns and project delays.        

An additional point to remember is that in Brazil the marketing of oil, natural gas and their derivatives is completely free. In other words, the companies may either sell oil, gas and their derivatives in the domestic market or export them — the only exception is linked to emergency situations that require to use all of the production domestically. 

The Libra P.S.C. set four different types of contractual guaranties:

  • Performance bond

  • Bid bond ($67.7 million)

  • Exploration activity financial bond ($264.9 million), whose goal is to ensure a payment in case the contractors fail to perform the minimum exploration program set for this contract.

  • Deactivation bond, whose goal is to ensure that there will be enough funds to carry out all the operations for deactivating and closing the fields.

PART II — The Libra Field — Drawing Some Initial Considerations

The goal of the paper is to provide some indications as for a valid model in order to assess the viability of investing in the Libra field. The proposed methodology, consisting of five consecutive analytical steps, i.e., net cash flows, fiscal parameters, N.P.V. & I.R.R., E.N.P.V, and sensitivity analysis, is the correct procedure to have a clear picture of the possible different outcomes of the Libra project. The next step will be to develop an annualized model. Of course, if all the data are publicly available or if it is possible to have some reliable estimates for certain parameters.

But, it’s already possible to draw some initial basic considerations with reference to the Libra P.S.C. Among them:

  • First of all, according to Brazil’s P.S.C. framework, the general new rules are indeed economically dangerous for Petrobras. In fact, according to law, in the pre-salt areas, the Brazilian company has to get at least a 30 percent stake in all the winning bids. In other words, unless the company has an active role in the auction, it will not have a say with reference to the terms the other bidders have committed to. In the Libra field auction, the fear was that the Chinese companies were more interested in accessing crude oil than in negotiating a low price. For sure, Petrobras would have found the first option quite unacceptable (expensive).

  • The profit oil table is a progressive tool in favor of the government, which gets a better profitability with higher oil prices and an improved well productivity. The minimum bid profit is 41.65 percent with an oil price between $100 to $120 per barrel and a well productivity of 10,000 bbl/d to 12,000 bbl/d. If the oil price is lower (higher) and well productivity is lower (higher), a fixed percentage, as defined by the table, is subtracted (added) from (to) the basic percentage of profit oil. Summing up, the lowest value in relation to the government profit oil is 15 percent while the highest value is 45.56 percent. What immediately emerges is that under low oil prices and low well productivity, the reduction in the percentage points of the profit oil to the government is quite consistent, and this means that the government assumes too much risk under a scenario of low oil prices and low well productivity. Under this scenario, it’s quite probable that companies will drill more wells than necessary. 


  • A signature bonus of $6.5 billion is very high for the industry standards. It’s a very regressive tool, and it creates a relevant distortion because it’s not recoverable for production sharing purposes; it’s equivalent to borrowing at a very high interest rate for no real need. The two charts below by Pedro van Meurs and Marcelo de A. Sampaio show that while the government take with and without the bonus signature is practically the same across all the ranges of oil prices, the I.R.R. changes consistently. The I.R.R. without the bonus is 4 percent higher with low oil prices and 13 percent higher with high oil prices. Indeed, it’s an important distortion. Van Meurs and Sampaio point out that two good alternatives could have been to avoid the bonus and to increase the minimum profit oil percentage to the government or to avoid the bonus and to introduce a Special Participation Tax, which is a progressive tool. Both alternatives would have generated more profits to the government, in particular the special participation tax. They calculate that at $100 a barrel, canceling the signature bonus and introducing a higher minimum bid or a special participation tax would have resulted in 41 billion dollars or $55 billion dollars more of revenues, respectively. Once a bonus is paid, the I.O.C.s rightly consider it a sunk cost; the I.O.C.s pay the bonus, but, then, the remaining government take will be lower in comparison to the international financial standards.



Moreover, the present price of oil, Petrobras’ current corruption scandal, and Petrobras’ lack of financial resources do not help the development of Brazil’s offshore fields. In specific, with reference to the price of oil, it’s worth to underline that oil price always fluctuates, continuously passing through different cycles, so it’s quite normal that, over the life of a petroleum project, there will be periods of high oil prices and periods of low oil prices (oil and gas are commodities). Honestly, it is unthinkable to have the same oil price for all the duration of an oil project. With reference to the lack of financial resources, Brazil is currently struggling to find a solution. Parliament is discussing a bill that could change part of Law 12,351, which requires Petrobras to always be the lead operator with at least a 30 percent share in a P.S.C. The modified law would give Petrobras the right of refusal to control and drill each field before the organization of an auction. The idea is to attract fresh capital from foreign companies, which, as a consequence of the bill, could be the operator, and exempting Petrobras from heavily borrowing financial resources. Still on the same track, in December 2015, rumors affirmed that Petrobras wanted to sell a quarter of its 40 percent stake in the Libra field with the goal of reducing its debt, although later the company denied this possibility.